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The present study used an experimental design to compare stigmatizing attitudes toward a 
hypothetical target individual described, depending on condition, as having Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), or no diagnostic label. 
Attributions for the diagnostic label varied across conditions as either biological or 
psychological in cause. Participants were queried about their attitudes toward the 
individual described in the vignette, and specific attitudes involving personal 
responsibility, pity, anger, fear, helping, and beliefs about coercion-segregation were 
examined. Based on modified labeling theory and attribution theory, we predicted that the 
highest levels of stigmatizing attitudes would be reported by participants assigned to the 
PTSD label/psychological attribution cause condition. We also investigated reported level 
of contact with persons with mental illness, personal experience with mental disorder, 
trauma exposure, and experience with the military as potential covariates with relations 
between conditions and attitudes. Contrary to hypotheses, overall stigmatizing attitudes 
were most pronounced in the no label/no attribution condition. Examination of the 
specific attitudes mentioned above (e.g., personal responsibility) resulted in mixed 
findings, some in line with extant theory and some in contrast. Findings are discussed in 
terms of foundational theory, implications, and directions for future research.
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Comparing Stigmatizing Attitudes toward Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic 
Brain Injury 
PTSD, as defined in the fifth edition text revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), is an anxiety 
disorder uniquely characterized by the requirement that the individual have experienced 
an event that involves the threat of death, serious injury, or violation of physical integrity. 
The emotional response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror, 
and the individual must endorse a minimum number of symptoms from a set of clusters 
including reexperiencing elements of the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli related to 
the event and general numbing of emotion and responsiveness, and persistent elevated 
physiological arousal. Finally, the set of symptoms must be present for more than one 
month, and must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in important areas of 
the individual’s life.  
Large-scale epidemiological studies show that psychological trauma is a common 
experience, with 69% (Norris, 1992; Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, & Best, 
1993) to 90% (Breslau et al., 1998) of U.S. participants reporting lifetime exposure to a 
qualifying traumatic event, depending on geographic location and sample. Estimates of 
lifetime rates of PTSD in the United States tend to be stable across time and studies, and 
range from 7% (Kessler et al., 2005) to 12% (Resnick et al., 1993). Among military 
service personnel and veterans, trauma exposure is common during wartime; for 
example, up to 89% of combat infantry deployed in Afghanistan or Iraq reported 
experiencing a potentially traumatic event (Hoge et al., 2004).  PTSD is one of the most 




population-based study showing nearly 10% of U.S. soldiers returning from Iraq and 5% 
returning from Afghanistan screened positive (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006). 
The stigma associated with the PTSD diagnosis is an important factor to consider 
when evaluating the impact of PTSD. Stigma is cited as one of the most important 
barriers to mental health care for military populations (Hoge, Castro, & Messer, 2004). A 
growing body of literature has shown that many veterans with PTSD do not seek 
treatment because of associated stigma, and stigma in these populations has been linked 
to negative attitudes toward mental health care (Ouimette et al., 2011; Pietrzak, Johnson, 
Goldstein, Malley, & Southwick, 2009). More broadly, mental disorder collectively 
accounts for more than 15% of the burden of all disease of all types and causes, and 4 of 
the 10 leading causes of disability worldwide are mental disorders (Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 
2000; Murray & Lopez, 1996). Research has shown that stigma plays a crucial role in the 
harmful effects of mental illness at the societal and individual level, resulting in 
diminished access to care (Druss & Rosencheck, 1998), willingness to seek treatment 
(Corrigan, 2004; Regier et al., 1993), lowered perceptions of self-esteem and self-worth 
(Wahl, 1999; Watson, Corrigan, Larson, & Sells, 2007), reduced access to meaningful 
employment and safe housing (Heather, 2006; Carling, 1990), and loss of civil rights 
such as voting, holding public office, and marriage (Hemmens, Miller, Burton, & Milner, 
2002). 
Empirical investigation has shown that, particularly for less chronic forms of 
mental illness, stigma may impart a burden independent of the symptoms of a disorder. 
For example, Link and colleagues found in a longitudinal study of dual-diagnosis 




impairment remained unchanged following treatment, even as symptoms of the primary 
disorder being treated (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar) and comorbid substance use declined 
substantially. Stigma reduction may therefore be an appropriate target for intervention 
(Link, Struening, Rahav, Phelan, & Nuttbrock, 1997; Wright, Gronfein, & Owens, 2000). 
It is becoming apparent that that stigma is a formidable barrier to progress in prevention 
and treatment of mental disorder (US Department of Health and Human Services, 1999; 
World Health Organization, 2001).  
Attribution and Stigma 
The belief that physical or biological, versus psychological, explanations for 
mental disorder will reduce stigma has become widespread. This view is reflected in 
public statements made by one of the most prominent mental health advocacy groups, for 
example, “scientific research has greatly expanded our understanding and firmly 
established that mental illnesses like major depression are biologically based brain 
diseases” (Johnson, 1989; National Alliance on Mental Illness, 2012).  The 
pharmaceutical industry has also promoted the idea that depression is caused by a 
“chemical imbalance,” treatable by medication, in television advertisements with broad 
distribution (Lacasse & Leo, 2005). Pharmacotherapy is becoming the most common 
treatment modality for mental illness, a complex phenomenon due at least in part to the 
influence of the brain disease model of mental disorder (Kirsch, 2011). This biological 
approach shifts attribution of cause away from psychological processes, which are 
assumedly under the control of the individual, to biological processes, which exist outside 
of conscious control. Biological malfunction is thought to be more forgivable (Weiner, 




stigma as a barrier to care (Corrigan, 2004), and it seems reasonable that messages 
attempting to reduce stigma by moderating the effects of labeling may be appealing to 
consumers. Little research has investigated whether biological attributions for mental 
disorder result in less stigmatizing attitudes, and results have uncovered a complex 
picture. For example, one study found that disease explanations versus psychological 
attributions for disordered behavior are associated with less blame placed on the 
individual, but approval of more coercive and punitive behavior toward the afflicted 
individual (Mehta & Farina, 1997). Describing mental illness as a brain disorder may 
imply that recovery is not possible, invoking fundamental “differentness” and separation, 
which is related to so-called benevolence stigma in which the target is perceived as 
incapable in functioning as an autonomous adult (Corrigan & Watson, 2004). 
Studies have compared attitudes toward mental disorder with attitudes toward 
physical conditions (e.g., “former back pain patient”), showing that reactions are far more 
likely to be negative toward the former (Link, 1987). However, these comparisons 
involve a fundamental problem in that people probably expect the disorder-driven 
behavior of individuals with mental illness to be very different from those with physical 
problems. For example, it could be that individuals with a history of hospitalization for 
back pain are perceived more favorably because their symptoms are less threatening in 
nature, rather than the “back pain patient” label activating less negative stereotypes. 
Some studies have attempted to further investigate the attitudes associated with various 
labels through the use of vignettes (Link, Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 2004). In studies of 
this type, participants are provided with a behavioral description of a hypothetical 




individual with schizophrenia, finding that “politically correct” labels (e.g., “consumer of 
mental health services”) received less negative reactions along some dimensions 
compared to diagnostic labels (e.g., “schizophrenic”) (Penn & Nowlin-Drummond, 
2001). However, these studies often involve what may be an important gap between 
labeling, activated stereotypes, and expected behavior – they frequently do not address 
the problem of behavior not matching relevant stereotypes. Studies of this type have 
reported on paradigms that asked participants to compare across discordant categories 
(such as the earlier example, comparing individuals labeled as back pain patients to 
individuals labeled as mentally ill), limiting examination of the specific effects of 
labeling on mental illness stigma. 
Overlap between Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury 
Comparisons of attitudes toward Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and 
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) may provide an opportunity for an investigation of the 
effect of psychological versus biological attributions for mental disorder. As a result of 
military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, PTSD and TBI have received a great deal of 
recent attention in the media and in the scientific literature, and have often been referred 
to as the “signature wounds” of these wars (Department of Defense Task Force on Mental 
Health, 2007).  
TBI is a syndrome that is caused by an external force damaging the structure and 
function of the brain. Head injury does not always cause TBI, and TBI is typically 
classified based on mechanism (closed vs. penetrating insult to the brain), clinical 
severity (most widely assessed by the Glasgow coma scale which assesses eye, motor, 




structural damage. TBI damage may result from both the primary impact trauma (e.g., 
concussive blast or gunshot wound to the head), associated with shearing of neural tracts, 
contusions, hematoma, and hypoxia of brain tissue, and so-called secondary damage, 
which occurs in the hours and days after the trauma and is associated with 
neurotransmitter dysfunction and inflammatory responses to the initial injury (Maas, 
Stocchetti, & Bullock, 2008). Less severe, closed-head TBI associated with shorter 
periods of loss of consciousness and more difficulty in assessing structural damage has 
become especially relevant in the current military combat context, thought to be most 
frequently caused by blast explosions and resulting concussive waves (“barotrauma”). So 
called “mild TBI” is characterized by persistent behavioral symptoms including 
irritability, problems with memory, headache, and problems with concentration (Hoge et 
al., 2008). In a large-scale study of TBI prevalence, about 75% cases were best 
categorized as mild (Langlois et al., 2003). 
There is a some symptom overlap between PTSD and mild TBI, with symptoms 
such as emotional numbing, depersonalization and derealization, amnesia, emotional 
reactivity to trauma cues, social detachment, diminished interest, insomnia, irritability, 
and concentration deficits attributable to either syndrome (Bryant, 2001; Bryant, 
Marosszeky, Crooks, & Gurka, 2000). Although etiologies of these disorders are distinct 
theoretically (again, however, with some overlap), both may result from many of the 
same types of events (e.g., riding in a vehicle destroyed by a roadside bomb may be a 
causal event driving a clinical diagnosis of either PTSD or TBI) but TBI is clearly 
conceptualized as a biological phenomenon, while PTSD is conceptualized as a 




similarity in triggering events, the symptom overlap, and the difficulty in identifying 
actual structural damage in the brain are factors that coalesce to create the potential for 
considerable diagnostic ambiguity between these disorders, especially for milder forms of 
TBI (which represent the greatest number of cases). Indeed, in one study 44% of soldiers 
with TBI also met criteria for PTSD (Hoge et al., 2008). The symptom overlap and 
diagnostic ambiguity between PTSD and TBI allow for a paradigm directly comparing 
biological to psychological attributions for disordered behavior. 
Stigma Theory 
Link and Phelan’s (2001) integrative theory of social stigma proposes that the 
process is best conceptualized as the co-occurrence of labeling, stereotyping, separation, 
status loss, and discrimination, operating in the context of a power differential. This 
theory challenges assertions that the deviant behavior of an individual is what primarily 
determines the evaluations and reactions that result in stigma. Instead, the labeling of an 
individual as a member of a group with a broadly undesirable attribute (e.g., mentally ill, 
HIV positive) leads to a cascade of negative consequences operating at levels from the 
social cognitive to the societal. For example, for an individual who has received a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, the diagnosis may serve as a label that is associated with 
negative connotations and that may set the stage for stereotyping. The associations 
between the label and attributes like “danger” serve to justify social separation resulting 
in “schizophrenics” being viewed and treated as different from others. This social 
separation is directly related to status loss and discrimination, for example the difficulty a 
person with schizophrenia might have attaining employment, housing, or a romantic 




of this model, can happen when members of low-power groups negatively evaluate 
members of high-power groups, but for stigma to occur associations between the label 
and negative attributes must become broadly learned and accepted in the culture and 
result in disadvantage for the target of the label. For example, investment bankers may be 
stereotyped as greedy or callous, but the generalization does not tend to result in 
significant loss of opportunity or social status, and so according to this model we would 
be in error to say investment bankers are a stigmatized group. 
The cognitive relationship between a label and undesirable attributes is often 
difficult to challenge. Labeling theory states that we learn the content of stereotypes as a 
consequence of cultural socialization, and consequently selectively attend to information 
consistent with the label (Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, & Dohrenwend, 1989). Mental 
illness stigma is a salient example of this socialization: some of the most common 
pejorative words used in contemporary language are mental illness colloquialisms (e.g., 
“he’s such a psycho,” or “she must be crazy”), which are often learned at an early age 
and used so frequently as to become unnoticeable as pejorative (Wahl, 1995). As labeling 
and resulting stereotyping is more likely to result in rejection than the actual behavior of 
an individual in many contexts, it becomes reasonable to think that a reasonable defense 
against stigmatization is to avoid labels associated with greater stigma. This may create 
situations in which disordered behavior may be less stigmatized if attributed to a label 
that has less negative associations.  
Variables influencing stigma endorsement. The contact hypothesis, as it relates 
to mental disorder, states that personal experience with people with mental illness is 




Penn, 1999). Increased contact of various types with individuals with severe mental 
illness has been shown to be associated with reduced stigma, both prospectively (e.g., 
campaigns to reduce stigma by creating contact with people with mental disorder), and 
retrospectively (e.g., those with more previous contact report lower stigmatizing 
attitudes) (Couture & Penn, 2003). Potential mechanisms include habituation to threat 
reactions associated with mental disorder stimuli (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & 
Kowai-Bell, 2001) and cognitive dissonance created by encountering individuals whose 
characteristics do not match expectations regarding people with mental illness (Gaertner, 
Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990).  
The Present Study 
In an effort to investigate the effects of psychiatric labels, we assessed attitudes 
toward PTSD and TBI using an experimental paradigm. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions, where they were presented with a written vignette that 
described a brief case study describing a hypothetical individual’s behavior and labeling 
that individual as having either PTSD or TBI. The vignettes also varied with respect to 
the implied cause of the disordered behavior (biological vs. psychological). The purpose 
of the experimental manipulation was to examine the causal role of labels (i.e., PTSD vs. 
TBI) and attributions (i.e., biological vs. psychological) for disordered behavior on 
stigmatizing attitudes. Ultimately, the four groups participants were randomized to 
included PTSD/psychological attribution, PTSD/biological attribution, TBI/biological 
attribution, and no label/no attribution. The no label group was included to establish a 
baseline of attitudes toward the individual described and their disordered behavior absent 




We hypothesized the following: 
1. Participants in the PTSD/psychological condition would report the highest 
levels of overall stigmatizing attitudes toward the target in the vignette, 
relative to the other three conditions (including the no label/no attribution 
condition). 
2. Participants in the PTSD/psychological condition would report the greatest 
levels of attributions of personal responsibility for disordered behavior toward 
the subject of the vignette, anger toward the target, and beliefs that the target 
should be helped relative to the other three conditions. 
3. Participants in the PTSD/biological condition would report greater levels of 
fear and coercion-segregation beliefs toward the target compared to the 
PTSD/psychological condition. 
4. Participants in the TBI/biological condition would report the greatest levels of 
fear and coercion segregation beliefs toward the target relative to the other 
three conditions. 
5. Participants in the no label/attribution condition would report the lowest 
overall levels of stigmatizing attitudes. 
Stigmatizing attitudes would be negatively correlated with degree of personal experience 
with mental disorder symptoms and being the object of labeling, amount of experience 
with others labeled with a mental disorder, and level of experience with persons in the 
military. If these variables were found to be correlated with stigmatizing attitudes they 






Of the 301 participants who took part in the study, 74.8% of participants were 
female (n = 225). The sample was ethnically diverse, with 41.9% identifying as 
Caucasian (n = 126), 41.5% as African American (n = 125), 6.6% as multiethnic (n = 20), 
3% as other (n = 9), 2.3% as Asian (n = 7), 2.0% as Hispanic (n = 6), and .3% as Native 
American (n = 1). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 55 years old (M = 21.39, SD = 
5.95). 2.3% did not report demographic data (n = 7). 
Procedure 
 Participants were undergraduate students recruited through the University of 
Memphis psychology department using SONA Systems (memphis.sona-systems.com), an 
Internet-based research participation tool that allows students enrolled in courses to 
engage in University-sponsored research in exchange for course credit. The scope of the 
study involved general attitudes toward the stimuli of interest, and thus no restrictions 
were placed on the sampling procedure. All data were collected online. Participants were 
asked to provide informed consent before completing the survey questionnaires. The 
study description on the SONA Systems website read as follows: 
We are interested in learning about attitudes toward people who have had 
traumatic or stressful experiences and their reactions that may follow these 
experiences. You do not have to have had a traumatic event happen to you in 
order to participate. Our study consists of a brief set of online surveys 
measuring attitudes toward trauma survivors. Participation in the study is 
entirely voluntary, and our only requirement is that you be at least 18 years of 




about 1 hr to complete. You will receive 1 credit for completing the survey 
and computer task. This study is being conducted by a clinical psychology 
graduate student at the University of Memphis, and has received the approval 
of the University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Participants were randomized to one of four conditions:  
1. PTSD label/psychological attribution 
2. PTSD label/biological attribution 
3. TBI label/biological attribution 
4. No label or attribution condition  
All participants completed the same questionnaires, but the condition to which the 
participant was randomized determined the labels and attributions associated with the 
target being evaluated.  
Materials 
 Vignettes. Depending on the condition into which they were randomized, 
participants were presented with one of four vignettes describing a fictional individual 
who was the target of their evaluations. For three of the conditions, descriptions of the 
individual and his behavior were be identical, save for the diagnostic label and the 
attribution for the label. A fourth comparison condition described the individual and 
behavior as in the previous conditions, but omitted labels and attributions. The symptoms 
described were identical across conditions, and reflect symptoms present in both 
disorders (as reviewed by Bryant, 2001 & 2011). 
The content of the vignettes were as follows (bold text is used here to emphasize 




1. PTSD label/psychological attribution condition: 
John is a 30-year-old Iraq War veteran who is now home from his tour of 
duty. While in Iraq, he was a passenger in a truck hit by a roadside bomb. 
John was diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a 
result of this incident. PTSD is a common psychological disorder 
following trauma. As a result of his PTSD, John is currently troubled by 
angry outbursts, intense emotions when reminded of the explosion, 
problems concentrating, reduced interest in hobbies and socializing with 
friends, memory problems, and feeling emotionally numb. 
2. PTSD label/biological attribution condition (note that the attribution for the 
cause of the disorder has been changed):  
John is a 30-year-old Iraq War veteran who is now home from his tour of 
duty. While in Iraq, he was a passenger in a truck hit by a roadside bomb. 
John was diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a 
result of this incident. PTSD is a common biological brain disorder 
following trauma. As a result of his PTSD, John is currently troubled by 
angry outbursts, intense emotions when reminded of the explosion, 
problems concentrating, reduced interest in hobbies and socializing with 
friends, memory problems, and feeling emotionally numb. 
3. TBI label/biological attribution condition: 
John is a 30-year-old Iraq War veteran who is now home from his tour of 
duty. While in Iraq, he was a passenger in a truck hit by a roadside bomb. 




this incident. TBI is a common biological brain disorder following 
trauma. As a result of his TBI, John is currently troubled by angry 
outbursts, intense emotions when reminded of the explosion, problems 
concentrating, reduced interest in hobbies and socializing with friends, 
memory problems, and feeling emotionally numb. 
4. No label or attribution condition: 
John is a 30-year-old Iraq War veteran who is now home from his tour of 
duty. While in Iraq, he was a passenger in a truck hit by a roadside bomb. 
John is currently troubled by angry outbursts, intense emotions when 
reminded of the explosion, problems concentrating, reduced interest in 
hobbies and socializing with friends, memory problems, and feelings that 
his emotions have become numb. 
 Manipulation check. Participants were assessed for comprehension of the 
vignette material. After being presented with the vignette, they were asked two questions, 
as follows: “Did you read all of the previous passage?” and “what was John diagnosed 
with?” If participants answered incorrectly, they were redirected back to the vignette.  
Questionnaires (see Appendix A) 
The Attribution Questionnaire (AQ; Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & 
Kubiak, 2003). The AQ, which served as the primary outcome measure, is a 21-item self-
report questionnaire designed to measure six interrelated constructs relevant to 
attributions regarding mental illness and resulting prejudice, including (1) Personal 
Responsibility (the degree to which the respondent believes the target’s mental disorder is 




(3) Anger (anger and irritation toward the target), (4) Fear/Dangerousness (how 
threatening the target is perceived as), (5) Helping (how likely the respondent is to avoid 
helping the target), and (6) Coercion-Segregation (how voluntary treatment and housing 
should be for the target). The AQ is intended to assess attributions toward a hypothetical 
individual described in a vignette. Items are rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 
“not very much” (1) to “very much” (9). A higher sum score indicates greater negative 
bias toward the target. Sample items include, “I would think that it was John’s [referring 
to the hypothetical individual described in the vignette] own fault that he is in the present 
condition” and, “How dangerous would you feel John is?” In the original Corrigan et al. 
study (2003), the AQ demonstrated good internal reliability for the six included 
constructs, with alpha values ranging from .70 to .96. The AQ has also demonstrated 
good construct validity across several studies; for example, those who rated people with 
mental illness as less blameworthy on the AQ were more likely to perform real-world 
helping behavior (Corrigan et al., 1999), and relevant constructs of the AQ (e.g., 
perceived controllability predicting avoidance and increased support for coercive 
treatment) correlate as predicted by the theory behind its design (Corrigan et al., 2003). 
For the present study, the AQ showed good internal consistency for the greater 21-item 
measure (α = .82), with subscales ranging from good to excellent as follows: Personal 
Responsibility (α = .81), Pity (α = .89), Anger (α = .88), Fear (α = .94), Helping (α = 
.82), and Coercion-Segregation (α = .88). 
 The Level of Contact Report (LOCR; Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, Canar, & 
Kubiak, 1999). Reported levels of contact with individuals with mental illness will be 




of 12 situations involving increasing degrees of interaction with individuals with mental 
disorder, starting with “I have never observed a person that I was aware of that had a 
mental illness” (1) to “I have a mental illness” (11). To ensure the applicability of the 
measure to a broad sample, it will be slightly modified to inform participants that the 
term “mental illness” encompasses a range of diagnoses from depression and anxiety 
disorders to more “serious” mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. 
Participants are instructed to endorse all items that apply to them, and the overall score is 
a rank reflecting the degree of intimacy or familiarity with individuals diagnosed with 
mental illness. Higher scores reflect greater levels of reported familiarity. For the present 
study, internal consistency was good (α = .71). 
 The Life Events Checklist (LEC; Gray, Litz, Hsu, & Lombardo, 2004). 
Traumatic life experiences will also be investigated as a potential covariate with 
stigmatizing attitudes. The LEC is a 17-item self-report measure intended to screen for 
lifetime exposure to traumatic events. Participants are presented with a list of 17 
potentially traumatic events (e.g., “sudden, unexpected death of someone close to you”) 
and asked to indicate whether the event happened to them, they witnessed it, they learned 
about it, are not sure whether it is relevant, or does not apply. The number of events 
directly experienced by the participant will be summed to create an index of exposure to 
trauma, with higher scores indicating greater reported exposure. 
Personal Experience with Mental Disorder. (PEMD). Participant experiences 
with mental disorder symptoms and experiences were investigated as a potential 
covariate with attitudes. A brief 14-item questionnaire was written by the author 




example items include, “I have never had any mental illness symptoms like anxiety or 
depression” and “My doctor has prescribed an antidepressant or other medication to treat 
mental health symptoms.” Responses were “yes” or “no” for each item. The number of 
symptoms and experiences endorsed by the participant were summed, with greater scores 
reflecting greater personal experience with mental disorder. In this study, the PEMD 
showed good internal consistency (α = .80). 
Level of Contact with Military. (LOCM). Because prior contact with the 
military was thought to potentially influence responses in this study, and we were unable 
to find an existing measure of this construct, we created this questionnaire. The LOCM 
includes 11 items describing varying degrees of contact and familiar with the military and 
its members. Example items include, “I have a friend who has served in the military 
during peacetime or outside of a combat situation” and “I would like or am working 
toward a military career.” Participants checked all applicable items which were then 
summed, with higher scores reflecting greater familiarity with the military. Internal 
consistency for this measure was acceptable (α = .65). 
 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
The data were examined for completeness. Of 301 participants, 96% (N = 289) 
completed all measures. Pairwise deletion was chosen considering the relatively small 
amount of missing data (Roth & Switzer, 1995). No measure exceeded 5% missing items 
per case. Outliers were identified and corrected based on the recommendations specified 




replacing these values with the adjacent non-outlier score. The primary study variables 
(AQ, PEMD, LOCR, LOCM, and LEC) were analyzed for skewness and kurtosis. None 
were significantly skewed or kurtotic. 
To examine the effect of labeling and attribution on stigmatizing attitudes while 
accounting for the influence of potential covariates, a one-way analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted in which the independent variable, group assignment, 
involved four levels: PTSD/psychological, PTSD/biological, TBI/biological, and no 
label/no attribution. Stigmatizing attitudes as measured by the full AQ score was the 
dependent variable. Covariates were included in the ANCOVA model if they were 
significantly correlated with the dependent measure and uncorrelated with group 
assignment. A series of post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the Sidak correction method 
were performed to test the study hypotheses concerning group differences. 
Additionally, we conducted an exploratory multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANCOVA) to examine the effect of group assignment on the six subscales of the AQ 
(i.e., Personal Responsibility, Pity, Anger, Fear, Helping, and Coercion-Segregation). The 
same potential covariates were examined for inclusion as described above. Similarly to 
the above analysis, a series of Sidak-corrected post-hoc contrasts were performed. 
Results 
Demographic Group Differences 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine demographic group 
differences for variables of interest (i.e., AQ, PEMD, LOCR, LOCM, and LEC). Women 
reported significantly higher levels of personal experience with mental disorder on the 




(292) = -1.17, p = .03). African Americans had a higher mean score on the PEMD than 
Caucasians (M = 3.04, SD = 2.71 for African Americans, M = 1.61, SD = 1.73 for 
Caucasians, t (249) = 4.95, p < .001). No other significant group differences were 
detected. 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
 Pearson correlations were calculated for the primary study variables. The 
following proposed covariates had small but significant correlations with the dependent 
variable AQ in the directions hypothesized: PEMD (r = -.14, p = .02), LOCM (r = -.16, p 
= .01), and LEC (r = -.15, p = .01) and so these variables were included as covariates in 
the ANCOVA and MANCOVA. Means, standard deviations, and correlations are 
presented in Table 1. 
ANCOVA for Stigmatizing Attitudes by Diagnostic Label/Attribution Condition 
The assumptions for ANCOVA investigating group differences on the full scale 
AQ score were met. PEMD, LOCM, and LEC were significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable AQ and were therefore included as covariates in the ANCOVA 
model. There were no significant interactions between the covariates and the dependent 
variable AQ, implying homogeneity of the regression slopes. A Levene’s test of equality 
of error variance was nonsignificant, implying homogeneity of variance for the dependent 
variable across conditions.  
The ANCOVA was significant, F (6, 281) = 5.86, p < .001 and details are 
presented in  Table 2. Contrary to hypotheses 1 and 5, the no label/no attribution 
condition had the highest adjusted levels of stigmatizing attitudes (M = 85.1, SEM = 




the PTSD/biological condition (M = 75.38, SEM = 2.1, p = .01) and the TBI/biological 
condition (M = 71.3, SEM = 2.3, p < .001) but not the PTSD/psychological condition (M 
= 78.53, SEM = 2.24, p = .213). Table 3 summarizes adjusted mean differences and 
Figure 1 depicts adjusted means. 
MANCOVA for Stigmatizing Attitudes Subscales by Diagnostic Label/Attribution 
Condition 
 The assumptions for a MANCOVA investigating the subscales of the AQ 
measure were met. PEMD, LOCR, LOCM, and LEC were found to be significantly 
correlated with the dependent variables and were therefore included as covariates in the 
MANCOVA model. Levene’s tests of equality of error variances for each dependent 
variable were nonsignificant, which was taken as evidence of homogeneity of variances 
for the dependent variables across conditions. A Box’s test of equality of covariance 
matrices was nonsignificant, implying homogeneity of covariances.  
 In the corrected model, there were significant group differences for all subscales 
of the AQ: Personal Responsibility, F (7, 280) = 9.87, p < .001, Pity, F (7, 280) = 7.04, p 
< .001 Anger, F (7, 280) = 4.43, p < .001, Fear, F (7, 280) = 2.93, p = .006, Helping, F 
(7, 280) = 6.16, p < .001, and Coercion-Segregation, F (7, 280) = 3.83, p = .001. Table 4 
summarizes results of the MANCOVA test.  
 Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were used to test study hypotheses. Consistent 
with hypothesis 2, the PTSD/psychological condition (M = 6.91, SEM = .48) had a 
significantly higher adjusted mean score on the Personal Responsibility subscale, in 
which higher scores indicate greater perceptions of internal control and responsibility for 




TBI/biological (M = 3.72, SEM = .50, p < .001) conditions; however, there was no 
significant difference between PTSD/psychological and no label/attribution (M = 7.96, 
SEM = .48 p = .56). Examining the Anger subscale, results were mixed regarding 
hypothesis 2: the PTSD/psychological condition (M = 7.66, SEM = .56) had a 
significantly higher mean score on Anger (with higher scores meaning the respondent 
would feel more anger toward the subject) than the TBI/Biological condition (M = 4.23, 
SEM = .58, p < .001) but not PTSD/Biological (M = 6.80, SEM = .52, p = .85) or no 
label/attribution (M = 7.23, SEM =  .56, p = .99). Contrary to hypothesis 2, Helping 
scores, which were reverse coded such that higher scores indicated less reported 
willingness to help the target, were not significantly higher for PTSD/Psychological than 
any other condition. Contrary to hypothesis 3, the PTSD/Biological group mean scores 
for Fear (in which higher scores indicated greater perception of dangerousness) and 
Coercion-Segregation (with higher scores meaning greater endorsement of social 
separation and involuntary treatment for the target) were not significantly higher than for 
the PTSD/Psychological condition. Finally, with respect to Hypothesis 4, which predicted 
that the TBI/Biological condition would have higher mean scores than the other 3 
conditions on the fear and coercion subscales, our findings did not confirm this. For Fear, 
the TBI/Biological condition mean score (M  = 12.91, SEM = .933) was significantly 
lower than no label/no attribution (M = 18.13, SEM = .91, p < .001) but there were no 
significant differences when compared to the PTSD/Psychological condition (M = 14.81, 
SEM = .91, p = .61) or the PTSD/Biological condition (M = 14.40, SEM = .85, p = .80). 
Examining Coercion-Segregation, there were no significant differences between 




Summary of Findings 
 Generally, study hypotheses were not supported. Interestingly, participants in the 
no label/no attribution condition reported greater levels of stigmatizing attitudes 
compared to participants in label conditions. Examining subscales of the dependent 
variable provides a more mixed picture. Differences between groups on many subscales 
were small. However, the most distinct differences were in theoretically-relevant 
subscales such as Fear/Danger and Personal Responsibility, in which results mirror the 
ANCOVA; i.e., for these subscales, participants in the no label/attribution condition 
reported the highest levels of stigmatizing attitudes. 
Discussion 
This research study experimentally investigated the combined effects of 
psychiatric diagnosis labeling with a specific focus on the distinction between 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) and attribution 
(psychological vs. biological vs. no attribution) on stigmatizing attitudes toward a 
fictitious individual with mental disorder following trauma as described in a vignette. The 
current study tested labeling theory and attribution theory as relevant to mental disorder 
stigma in a novel manner, using specific diagnostic labels, while describing the same 
disordered behavior across label and attribution conditions. Taking advantage of the 
diagnostic ambiguity between PTSD and TBI, the disordered behavior ascribed to the 
target individual was typical of either disorder allowing for isolation of the effect of 
labeling and attribution. 
 In terms of overall stigmatizing attitudes, there were no significant group 




and attribution. However, the fourth group (no label/no attribution) evidenced the highest 
overall level of stigmatizing attitudes, significantly higher than attitudes toward the 
individual in the PTSD/biological condition and TBI/biological condition and similar in 
level to the PTSD/psychological condition. We had predicted, based on labeling theory, 
that diagnostic labels would cause greater levels of reported stigmatizing attitudes. This 
surprising finding suggests that both PTSD and TBI diagnostic labels may protect against 
stigmatizing attitudes when combined with biological attributions for disorder. This is 
contrary to modified labeling theory (Link et al., 1989) which states that labels are a 
primary causal agent of negative attitudes toward individuals with mental disorder, and 
may have a greater influence on observers’ perceptions of individuals with psychological 
disorder than do the disordered or deviant behavior. Labeling theory is an important 
component of Link and Phelan’s influential theory of social stigma (2001), upon which 
many of the current study’s hypotheses were based. There are a number of potential 
reasons the current study deviated from these important theories. First, we used very 
specific labels. Rather than considering mental disorder as a broad, diffuse construct, we 
used specific diagnostic labels. The causal effect of these specific diagnostic labels on 
stigmatizing attitudes has not been investigated to our knowledge. Second, we used the 
same description of the individual’s behavior in all of the vignettes, altering only the 
diagnostic label (PTSD/TBI) and whether the disorder was described as biological or 
psychological. It may be that in this instance, diagnostic labels helped participants 
understand and empathize with threatening or confusing behavior. It is also possible that 
attitudes toward mental disorder are changing. There has been a great deal of effort to 




disorder stigma more broadly (e.g., Corrigan, 2011, 2012; Dickstein, Vogt, Handa, & Litz 
2010). Perhaps these efforts have been successful. Although this would be encouraging, 
without further investigation it is not possible to speculate whether it is veteran-related 
mental health attitudes that are improving or attitudes overall. It is also possible that 
diagnostic labels are protective. This would be very interesting, as there have been 
findings that perceptions of dangerousness are one of the most important perceptions 
driving stigmatizing beliefs. It may also be that the findings are better explained by 
attribution theory.  Finally, another potential explanation for these findings is that all 
participants were undergraduate students in psychology courses and perhaps this group is 
less inclined toward stereotyping individuals with psychological disorders; however, 
much research on the social stigma of mental disorder has included psychology students 
as their subject pool. 
 Findings for subscales of the stigma measure were mixed. First, participants in the 
PTSD/psychological condition and the no label/no attribution condition had a higher 
mean score on the Personal Responsibility subscale than the other two conditions. This 
suggests that participants believed the target had greater control over and responsibility 
for their disordered behavior when said behavior was not associated with or explained by 
a label or attribution. Perceptions of responsibility and control are central to attribution 
theory (Weiner et al., 1988). Disordered actions perceived to be under the control of the 
actor are generally judged more negatively compared to those whose mental health status 
is not controllable. However, it has also been observed that those who are seen to have 
little chance for control of their deviant actions are judged to be fundamentally different 




attributions for disordered behavior are generally consistent with less personal 
responsibility and control (Weiner et al., 1988). In the present study, we saw that the 
PTSD and TBI labels combined with biological attributions for disorder cause lower 
perceptions of controllability and responsibility, which is generally consistent with 
attribution theory. 
Perceptions of fear and dangerousness are important when examining mental 
illness stigma. Fear of the person carrying a diagnosis may be one of the primary 
mechanisms driving stigma (Martin, Pescosolido, & Tuch, 2000). Our results show that 
participants reported the greatest levels of fear and dangerousness for the no label/no 
attribution condition. The difference was significant between the TBI/Biological 
condition and the no label/no attribution condition, which evidenced the largest 
difference. Again, it may be that a label that seems to account for, or to explain 
dangerous or threatening behavior creates understanding and reduces perceived risk. The 
pattern of scores on the Anger subscale was somewhat similar to the Fear subscale, in 
that the TBI/Biological condition had the lowest scores. Participants reported the least 
anger in this condition, but scores on the anger subscale were not differentiated across the 
other conditions. This is in line with attribution theory in that participants reported that 
they would be least angry when the vignette they read described a scenario wherein the 
disordered behavior was likely perceived to be outside of the subject’s conscious control.  
The pattern of findings related to benevolent attitudes was interesting. Participants 
in the TBI/Biological condition reported the highest levels of Pity, while participants in 
the PTSD/Psychological condition reported the lowest level, although with respect to 




conditions. Finally, there were not any group differences for Coercion-Segregation. This 
may be because the language for this subscale is not relevant to modern conceptions of 
mental disorder – coercive inpatient hospitalization is far less frequent than in the past. 
But, of course, much of stigma theory is based on cultural perceptions regarding mental 
illness, so it is difficult to say if it captures relevant attitudes. 
Our findings might be interpreted as encouraging. Participants reported more 
stigmatizing attitudes when the described behavior was not labeled or attributed to 
psychological or biological causes. It might be that for PTSD and TBI these labels helped 
participants make sense and understand what would otherwise be dangerous and 
threatening behavior. It is possible that anti-stigma campaigns have improved attitudes 
toward individuals with mental disorder. In particular, a number of agencies have made 
efforts to reduce the stigma of mental illness for returning veterans of recent conflict 
(e.g., Dingfelder, 2009). More broadly, it may also be that the specificity of diagnostic 
labels reduces stigmatizing attitudes. This is an understudied area. Overall, it appears 
consistent with attribution theory that in the present study attribution had a larger impact 
on attitude than label, but it is difficult, because of the size of the effects and the design of 
the study, to tease out the individual contribution of each factor.  
Limitations of the Present Study 
There are some limitations of the present study. The sample was comprised of 
students taking at least one psychology course, which introduces the possibility that their 
attitudes toward mental illness are not representative of broader populations. However, 
the university at which the research was conducted has a diverse student body, which is 




desirability biases or limited self-awareness, participants are not always willing or able to 
disclose stigmatizing attitudes via self-report. This phenomenon has been documented in 
other domains, such as race (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), but is not well studied in 
mental health stigma, which may still be acceptable to for many to disclose. Finally, 
interactions between label and attribution would have been interesting to examine, but 
would have required a different design. 
Future studies should address several issues raised by this research. First, broader 
samples are necessary to determine whether labeling and providing attributions protect 
against mental disorder stigma. Other specific diagnostic labels should be investigated, 
perhaps on a continuum of association with fear and dangerousness. Non-self-report 
methods such as implicit association tasks should be used to determine whether automatic 
associations differ from reported bias. Finally, investigating relations between assessed 
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Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Study Variables 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
        
1. AQ 77.58 19.61 -     
2. PEMD 2.32 2.43 -.14* -    
3. LOCR 3.97 2.35 -.11 .54** -   
4. LOCM 2.65 1.93 -.16** .19** .41** -  
5. LEC 2.64 2.57 -.15* .25** .39** .32** - 
        
Note. N = 301. AQ = Attribution Questionnaire; PEMD = Personal Experience with 
Mental Disorder; LOCR = Level of Contact Report; LOCM = Level of Contact with 








Analysis of Covariance for Stigmatizing Attitudes by Diagnostic Label/Attribution 
Condition 
 
Source SS df MS F p 
      
PEMD 1203.53 1 1203.53 3.45 .06 
LOCM 1186.25 1 1186.25 3.40 .07 
LEC 693.62 1 693.62 1.99 .16 
Condition 6987.02 3 2329.01 6.67 .00 
Error 98085.30 281 349.06   
Total 1843872.00 288    
Note. PEMD = Personal Experience with Mental Disorder; LOCM = Level of Contact 







Pairwise Post-Hoc Adjusted Mean Contrasts for AQ by Condition 
 
Group M Adjusted M 1. 2. 3. 4. 
       
1. PTSD/psych 79.27 78.53 -    
2. PTSD/bio 74.44 75.38 -3.15 -   
3. TBI/bio 71.44 71.30 -7.23 -4.10 -  
4. None 85.30 85.10 6.56 9.72* 13.79** - 












SS df MS F p 





1126.26 7 160.89 9.87 < .001 
 Pity 1561.11 7 223.02 7.04 < .001 
 Anger 675.87 7 96.55 4.43 < .001 
 Fear 1178.00 7 168.29 2.93 .006 
 Helping 2013.75 7 287.68 6.16 < .001 
 Coercion-
Segregation 





16.31   
 Pity 8873.11 280 31.69   
 Anger 6101.63 280 21.79   
 Fear 16067.75 280 57.39   
 Helping 13074.47 280 46.70   
 Coercion-
Segregation 
10645.74 280 38.02   
Total Personal 
Responsibility 
14771.00 288    
 Pity 122417.00 288    
 Anger 19102.00 288    
 Fear 82617.00 288    
 Helping 123317.00 288    
 Coercion-
Segregation 
48294.00 288    
       




















































































The Attribution Questionnaire 
[Note that items refer to “John,” the fictional character described in the vignettes] 
Personal Responsibility Beliefs 
1. I would think that it were John’s own fault that he is in the present condition. (1 = 
no, not at all; 9 = yes, absolutely so). 
2. How controllable, do you think, is the cause of John’s present condition? (1 = not 
at all under personal control; 9 = completely under personal control). 
3. How responsible, do you think, is John for his present condition? (1 = not at all 
responsible; 9 = very much responsible). 
Pity 
1. I would feel pity for John. (1 = none at all; 9 = very much). 
2. How much sympathy would you feel for John? (1 = none at all; 9 = very much). 
3. How much concern would you feel for John? (1 = none at all; 9 = very much). 
Anger 
1. I would feel aggravated by John. (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 
2. How angry would you feel at John? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 
3. How irritated would you feel by John? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 
Fear 
1. How dangerous would you feel John is? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 
2. I would feel threatened by John? (1 = no, not at all; 9 = yes, very much). 
3. How scared of John would you feel? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 





1. If I were an employer, I would interview John for a job. (1 = not likely; 9 = very 
likely). 
2. I would share a car pool with John each day. (1 = not likely; 9 = very likely). 
3. How certain would you feel that you would help John? (1 = not at all certain; 9 = 
absolutely certain). 
4. If I were a landlord, I would probably rent an apartment to John. (1 = not likely; 9 
= very likely). 
Coercion-Segregation 
1. I think John poses a risk to his neighbors unless he is hospitalized. (1 = not at all; 
9 = very much). 
2. I think it would be best for John’s community if he were put away in a psychiatric 
hospital (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 
3. How much do you think an asylum, where John can be kept away from his 
neighbors, is best? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). 
4. If I were in charge of John’s treatment, I would force him to live in a group home. 





The Level of Contact Report 
Please read each of the following statements carefully. After you have read all the 
statements below, place a check by any of the statements that best depict your familiarity 
with persons with a mental illness. Note that the term “mental illness” can refer to a range 
of disorders, for example from anxiety and depression to schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder. 
[Note that the rank score is shown here in brackets and will not be included in the final 
questionnaire.] 
o I have watched a movie or television show in which a character depicted a person 
with mental illness. [3] 
o My job involves providing services/treatment for persons with a mental illness. 
[8] 
o I have observed, in passing, a person I believe may have had a mental illness. [2] 
o I have observed persons with a mental illness on a frequent basis. [5] 
o I have a mental illness. [12] 
o I have worked with a person who had a mental illness at my place of employment. 
[6] 
o I have never observed a person that I was aware had a mental illness. [1] 
o My job includes providing services to persons with mental illness. [7] 
o A friend of the family has a mental illness. [9] 
o I have a relative who has a mental illness. [10] 
o I have watched a documentary on the television about mental illness. [4] 




The Live Events Checklist 
Listed below are a number of difficult or stressful things that sometimes happen to 
people. For each event check one or more of the boxes to the right to indicate that: (a) it 
happened to you personally, (b) you witnessed it happen to someone else, (c) you learned 
about it happening to someone close to you, (d) you’re not sure if it fits, or (e) it doesn’t 
apply to you. 
Be sure to consider your entire life (growing up as well as adulthood) as you go through 











1. Natural disaster (for 
example, flood, hurricane, 
tornado, earthquake) 
     
2. Fire or explosion      
3. Transportation accident (for 
example, car accident, boat 
accident, train wreck, plane 
crash) 
     
4. Serious accident at work, 
home, or during recreational 
activity 
     














(for example, dangerous 
chemicals, radiation) 
6. Physical assault (for 
example, being attacked, hit, 
slapped, kicked, beaten up) 
     
7. Assault with a weapon (for 
example, being shot, stabbed, 
threatened with a knife, gun, 
bomb) 
     
8. Sexual assault (rape, 
attempted rape, made to 
perform any type of sexual act 
through force or threat of 
harm) 
     
9. Other unwanted or 
uncomfortable sexual 
experience 
     
10. Combat or exposure to a 
war-zone (in the military or as 
a civilian) 














11. Captivity (for example, 
being kidnapped, abducted, 
held hostage, prisoner of war) 
     
12. Life-threatening illness or 
injury 
     
13. Severe human suffering      
14. Sudden, violent death (for 
example, homicide, suicide) 
     
15. Sudden, unexpected death 
of someone close to you 
     
16. Serious injury, harm, or 
death you caused to someone 
else 
     
17. Any other very stressful 
event or experience 






Personal Experience with Mental Disorder 
Please read each of the following statements carefully. After you have read all the 
statements below, place a check by any of the statements that best depict your personal 
experience with mental illness. Be sure to check any item that has ever applied to you 
(for example, if you have been prescribed a medication for a mental illness in the past, 
but are not taking it now, please check the item asking about medication). 
o I have never had any mental illness symptoms like anxiety or depression. 
o I have seen a religious or spiritual counselor or advisor for help with a mental 
illness. 
o My doctor has suggested an antidepressant or other medication to treat mental 
health symptoms. 
o I have seen a psychiatrist for help with a mental illness. 
o I have seen a therapist or counselor for help with a mental illness. 
o I believe I have a mental illness but have not talked to anyone about it. 
o I have thought about seeing a therapist or counselor for help with a mental illness. 
o I have had mental illness symptoms like anxiety or depression, but they were very 
brief and went away on their own. 
o My doctor has prescribed an antidepressant or other medication to treat mental 
health symptoms. 
o I have had mental illness symptoms like anxiety or depression, and they did not 
go away on their own. 
o I believe I have a mental illness and have talked to a health care provider or 




o I have been diagnosed with a mental illness by a doctor, psychologist, nurse, 
therapist, or another health care provider. 
o Friends or family have told me they believe I have a mental illness. 





Level of Experience with Military 
Please read each of the following statements carefully. After you have read all the 
statements below, place a check by any of the statements that best depict your personal 
experience with the military. Be sure to check any item that has ever applied to you (for 
example, if you had served in the military in the past, but are not currently active, please 
check the item saying “I have served in the military”) 
o I have never seen a movie or television show with a military theme, or have not 
seen coverage of military events on television. 
o I enjoy movies or television shows with a military theme, or actively keep up on 
news about military actions. 
o I have a friend that has served in the military during peacetime or outside of a 
combat situation. 
o I have a friend that has served in the military and was involved in combat. 
o I have a family member that has served in the military during peacetime or 
outside of a combat situation. 
o I have a family member that has served in the military and was involved in 
combat. 
o I would like to join a branch of the military one day. 
o I would like or am working toward a military career. 
o I served in the military during peacetime or outside of a combat situation. 
o I served in the military and was involved in combat. 
o I served or currently serve in the military and plan a military career in the future. 
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